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Resource Allocation for Equity in the British National Health Service 
1948-89: an Advocacy Coalition Analysis of the ‘RAWP’ 
 
The British National Health Service (NHS) is one of the oldest examples among 
the liberal democracies of a single-payer, publicly funded health system.  It was 
launched in 1948, following legislation in 1946/7, with three core principles.  It 
would be universal in coverage, furnish a comprehensive range of services, and 
be free at the point of use, with funding coming principally from general taxation 
levied centrally. According to its founder, Britain would become ‘more 
wholesome, more serene, and spiritually healthier, if its citizens have the 
knowledge that they and their fellows, have access, when ill, to the best that 
medical skill can provide’ (Bevan 1952: 75).  Over its seventy years these 
principles have frayed at the edges, with the status of non-British citizens 
compromising universalism, the porous boundary with social care challenging 
comprehensiveness, and the introduction of charges for prescriptions, dentistry 
and ophthalmics undermining free treatment. Nonetheless, the NHS’s principles 
and values remain essentially intact and politically popular (Gorsky 2008). 
 
As momentum in global health builds behind the agenda of Universal Health 
Coverage, this ‘Beveridge’ model health system is enjoying a revival of interest 
among analysts.  Pluralist developmental models incorporating substantial user 
fees have proven to impose barriers to access, while empirical evidence that 
public systems deliver better outcomes in low-income settings has emerged 
(Yates 2009; Moreno-Serra and Smith 2015). In these circumstances, the NHS 
can reasonably be proffered as ‘.... a highly applicable ... means for effectively 
financing a universal coverage system providing access to cost-effective care’, 
while scoring ‘... consistently high on international benchmarking comparisons ... 
especially on equity’ (Chalkidou and Vega 2013). The NHS funding model, and 
related devices through which a centrally administered system achieves 
efficiency and equity therefore merit scrutiny.   
 
The subject of this essay is one key device, commonly dubbed the ‘RAWP’.  This 
awkward acronym refers to the Resource Allocation Working Party, a committee 
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of the government’s Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS), 
established in 1975, and reporting in 1976.  It is also synonymous with a novel 
formula introduced by the committee, through which the state disbursed funding 
to the NHS regions.  The formula’s guiding principle was that need for medical 
care in a given population could be systematically calculated, allowing resources 
to be allocated in a fair and transparent manner.   
 
There are two reasons why the RAWP’s history has larger relevance to present 
day debates about health policy.  The first is as a case study of ‘equity of access’ 
in the policy arena. At international level the idea that the furtherance of equity 
is a legitimate health system function emerged in the 1970s and subsequently 
became commonly recognized (Anderson 1972: 81, 93, 161-5; World Bank 1993: 
54-5, 69-71).  This acceptance may be understood as a political expression of 
ethical principles, whether rights-driven or paternalistic, or of individual self-
interest in managing risk.  Simply defined, equity implies that ‘all should have 
access to health services regardless of income or residence’, yet in practice it has 
been understood mostly in terms of completeness of coverage or fairness of 
contributions (Anderson 1972, 5; WHO 2000, 35-9).  However, the historical 
experience of the British NHS shows that even when universal cover through 
progressive taxation is established, other dimensions of equity, for example in 
relation to utilization, health outcomes or geographical access may remain 
unsolved (Hollingsworth, Hage & Hanneman 1990).  The RAWP episode 
illustrates how the problem of equity of access by ‘residence’ came to be 
articulated and addressed within a single-payer system. 
 
It is important secondly as a historical case study of innovation and success in 
health policy-making.  Politically, the terrain of equity is highly contentious, even 
for a country like Britain where ‘socialized medicine’ seems a settled aspect of 
public life.  On the one hand, there have always been critics of the NHS who have 
objected from libertarian or economic liberal perspectives (Seaton 2015).  On 
the other, redistribution of resources for health, albeit in the name of social 
justice, creates both winners and losers. As in any health system, interests such 
as medical professionals and hospital administrators may be expected to object if 
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their power is threatened (Alford 1977).  There are also formidable technical 
challenges to successful policy-making in this area, for how exactly is ‘need’ for 
medical care to be defined and measured, when both biological and social factors 
are in play?  Given these political and practical impediments then, it is surprising 
that the RAWP succeeded at all, and this makes it a particularly intriguing case 
study. 
 
The discussion begins with an introductory description of Britain’s NHS, then 
provides essential details of the RAWP and its context.  Next it reviews existing 
literature on the episode, arguing that this has given insufficient weight to the 
importance of ideas and of actors below the level of political leadership.  The 
following section outlines a conceptual approach drawn from political science 
that adopts just such an analysis, the ‘advocacy coalition framework’.  This is a 
generic model of policy change whose explanatory power helpfully illuminates 
the RAWP case-study. The argument that follows emphasizes three main factors 
of change: the importance over the medium term of policy-learning driven by the 
research community; the key role of mid-level bureaucrats in supporting 
implementation and embedding of the initiative; and the framing of the RAWP 
debate as essentially technical, even though it touched on core values and was 
potentially controversial. 
 
The British NHS: history and structure 
 
Amongst the myriad classificatory schemes used in health systems analysis, 
Britain’s NHS has historically been viewed as an ideal type, for its ‘universal 
service pattern’ of free care as a public benefit, and its ‘polar’ organizational 
model, in which the state was the dominant payer and provider (Roemer 1960: 
158; Anderson 1963: 842).  It was established after the Second World War as a 
key element of the welfare state, inspired by the universalist blueprint of the 
Beveridge Report, and put into place by the social democratic Labour 
government, following its 1945 election victory.  The arrangements that the NHS 
replaced were characterised by localism and diversity (Webster 1988).  Medicine 
for the middle class had been predominantly private, while payroll-based health 
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insurance covered blue-collar workers for primary care.  Voluntary hospitals 
funded by philanthropy or mutualism dominated acute care for the working 
class, with psychiatric and long-stay institutions provided by local government 
or the Poor Law.  Municipal public health departments oversaw infectious 
diseases, clinical services for women and children, and preventive care.  All this 
was swept aside in 1948, with hospitals taken into national ownership and 
staffed by salaried doctors and nurses, and primary care physicians (‘general 
practitioners’) employed under contract by the NHS.  In place of pluralist funding 
sources, income now came principally from progressive national taxation 
dispensed annually by the Treasury, with private medicine permitted, but 
marginal.    
 
The administrative base of medicine in charitable and local political structures 
was also replaced under the NHS, by a hierarchical system (Webster 1988, 2002; 
Klein 2005).  At its apex was the national government, whose Ministry of Health 
(renamed in 1968 the DHSS) had prime responsibility for the service.  Executive 
power notionally lay with the Minister of Health (renamed in 1968 Secretary of 
State) appointed by the Prime Minister from amongst the senior politicians of 
the governing party, and supported by junior ministers and advisers.  Day-to-day 
control over the NHS was exercised by the Ministry’s civil servants.  Sometimes 
described as ‘Britain’s ruling class’, such government bureaucrats held 
permanent appointments, were nominally non-partisan and in addition to 
implementing policy participated in its development (Hennessy 1989: 342).  
Democratic accountability for the NHS resided principally with the national 
parliament, for only limited public health duties now remained with elected local 
authorities.  New Regional Hospital Boards (RHBs) were created, run by 
appointees of the Minister, while separate Executive Councils, on which local 
doctors sat alongside appointees, oversaw primary care.  This arrangement 
persisted until 1974 when the ‘tripartite structure’ was replaced by tiered 
Regional, Area and District Health Authorities which mapped onto local 
government boundaries, the better to integrate preventive, primary and hospital 
care.  
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Very crudely the political economy of the NHS in its first forty years can be 
summarised as follows.  Though technically a ‘command and control system’ 
there were initially ‘rather few commands and precious little control’ (LeGrand 
2003: 49).  Government proffered advice and allocated financing, but managerial 
responsibility was delegated to local level, remaining largely in the hands of pre-
NHS medical and political elites.  Nationally a broad consensus over the service 
obtained between the governing Conservative and Labour parties, though 
Conservatives were more inclined to constrain expenditure, particularly in the 
1950s and 1980s (Webster 2005; Appleby 1999).  Growth in the 1960s fuelled 
quality improvements in general practice and a hospital renewal program, 
before economic difficulties slowed welfare state expansion in the 1970s.  
Henceforth political conflict over the NHS intensified as governments sought to 
contain costs and extend managerial authority, culminating (as readers of this 
journal will know) in more radical structural reform in 1989, when the Thatcher 
government launched its ‘internal market’ (Klein 2013).   
 
The RAWP: key features and research questions 
 
The RAWP episode therefore manifested the mid-seventies moment when 
central government began to pursue a more interventionist policy.  However it 
also sprang from a contradiction present from the start of the NHS.  The service’s 
Labour architect Aneurin Bevan had promised it would ‘universalise the best’ for 
all citizens, addressing spatial inequities rooted in the ‘caprice of charity’ and the 
patchiness of local government financing (Bevan 1946: 46, 49).  For example, the 
interwar distribution of voluntary hospital capacity was so uneven that in-
patient admission rates varied five-fold across the major cities (Mohan 2006; 
Gorsky, Mohan and Powell 1999). London, in which about 25% of English and 
Welsh voluntary beds in were located, was particularly privileged, as the location 
of venerable teaching hospitals and many specialist institutions attractive to 
philanthropy (Pinker 1966: 57). Although municipal hospitals partially 
ameliorated voluntary unevenness public expenditure varied significantly 
according to the local wealth base, and these had worse staffing ratios, fewer 
technical facilities and less outpatient capacity (Levene, Powell and Stewart 
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2004; Powell 1992; Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth 1985). Nor had statutory 
health insurance overturned the market incentives which determined the 
geography of primary care. A six-fold difference in doctor/population ratios 
existed between major cities, with mining and industrial locations the least 
favored (Powell 2005).   
 
Despite these problems, and Bevan’s rhetoric, the founding legislation contained 
no program for geographical redistribution, assuming instead that the new 
regional authorities would resolve these issues.  However, there was no local 
enthusiasm for reforms which might disturb existing medical power structures, 
and resources continued to be apportioned largely on the basis of pre-1948 
expenditure patterns.  This meant that twenty years into the life of the NHS the 
existing distribution of facilities was little changed, thanks to ‘the inertia built 
into the system by history’ (DHSS 1976: 7).  The first challenge for RAWP 
historians will therefore be to explain how an apparently marginal concern rose 
to prominence in the mid-1970s. 
 
Before this though, some preliminary details of the committee and the solution it 
proposed are needed. The RAWP was set up in May 1975 by the Labour 
government led by Harold Wilson.  The politician formally responsible was 
Barbara Castle, Secretary of State at the DHSS, on the left of the party, and 
remembered for championing not only egalitarianism in the NHS but also 
disability rights and equal pay for women (Perkins 2003).  However, it was her 
Minister of Health, the more centrist David Owen, who led the initiative. The 
committee’s brief was to review and improve the process through which central 
funding was allocated geographically.  The RAWP’s response was a novel 
formula which aligned funding with population health needs.  It began with the 
principle that the ‘needs’ to which a health service should respond were not the 
same as public demand, which tended to be ‘always one jump ahead’ of what a 
nation’s limited resources could deliver .  Instead it proposed that the needs of a 
given place could be systematically calibrated with reference to its demographic 
features, adjusted to account for its specific ‘morbidity characteristics’.  Funding 
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could then be dispensed in response to ‘need’, rather than existing ‘supply’ or 
incalculable consumer ‘demand’ (DHSS 1976: 7-9).   
 
What was the solution that the RAWP devised?  Figure 1 illustrates the working 
of the formula, whose main principle was to allocate resources on the basis of 
geographical population levels (Row 1), weighted to reflect various 
considerations.  The first modifying effect (Row 2) was anticipated variations in 
usage of hospital and community services.  This was established by separately 
weighting seven main fields of activity, principally by regional sex and age 
structure (using national utilization data); in the case of psychiatric hospitals the 
known epidemiological link between marital status and utilization was also 
incorporated. Next a further adjustment was added to account for variations in 
morbidity (Row 3), for which the chosen tool was Standardized Mortality Ratios 
(SMRs).  The RAWP argued that these provided the best available proxy for 
morbidity, and thus need for non-psychiatric care. Moreover, because they 
provided a direct measure of health care need, SMRs obviated the requirement 
to include in the formula factors such as ‘occupation, poverty, social class and 
pollution’, with which they already overlapped  (DHSS 1976: 14-15). 
Standardized fertility rates were also incorporated to calibrate demand for 
maternity services. Final adjustments (Row 4) were made to account for: cross-
boundary patient flows related to hospital location or tourism; existing numbers 
of long stay patients; extra costs of teaching hospitals (the Service Increment for 
Teaching, SIFT); and a London weighting.  
 
The pattern of implementation from the late 1970s, when the formula was well 
established, to the late 1980s when it underwent adjustment in response to the 
internal market, is shown in Figure 2.  Immediate transition to the new  
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Figure 1: The RAWP Formula.  Source: adapted from Royal Commission on the National Health Service, Allocating health resources: A 
commentary on the Report of the Resource Allocation Working Party (London, 1978), figure 1 
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Figure 2: Distance from RAWP formula target, Regional Health Authorities in England, 1979/80-1988/89.  Source: DHSS, Review 
of the Resource Allocation Working Party Formula, London: HMSO, 1988, Figure 1.1 p.6   
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dispensation was rejected: losers would struggle to maintain services, and would 
probably close hospitals, while winners might make inefficient use of major 
increases due to inexperience.  Instead the approach was one of gradual advance 
to the RAWP target.  The graph illustrates the privileged position of the four 
metropolitan regions - London and the Home Counties - and the relative 
disadvantage of the North, with an initial range of budgetary excess or shortfall 
around the RAWP target of 22%. By 1988/9 this had narrowed to about 11%, or, 
if the two outlying North Thames regions are excluded, to a range of only 6%.    
 
Here then is evidence for the success of the RAWP, in bringing the regions 
substantially closer to equalization.  The case for success also rests on the claim 
that the RAWP instilled two enduring principles into health policy.  One was that 
equality of access for citizens with equal need was a desirable, popular and 
attainable goal.  The other was that this should be achieved by empirical 
formulation, rather than by the informed judgment of civil servants.  The second 
research question the RAWP provokes then, is to account for this 
accomplishment. 
 
RAWP by the Historians 
 
The RAWP episode is briefly treated in the major NHS histories as well as in 
three more detailed studies, with several actors in the events amongst its 
scholars.  The official historian of the NHS, Charles Webster, attributes action 
principally to ministerial leadership.  He emphasizes Barbara Castle’s role, 
regarding RAWP as part of her larger programme of priority setting (Webster 
1996: 606-13).  An avowed admirer of an egalitarian NHS, Webster is critical of 
the RAWP’s ‘limited progress’, considering this to have been slowed by Treasury 
hesitancy and Thatcherite disinterest (Webster 2002: 84-7). Geoffrey Rivett, 
author of another major survey text, was a DHSS civil servant in the period.  He 
similarly attributes the RAWP initiative to Labour politicians, with Richard 
Crossman (Secretary of State 1968-70) as the progenitor, and Owen and Castle 
responding to a ‘deep-seated political imperative to redress the inequalities in 
provision’; he sees this as a consequence of the 1974 reorganisation, which 
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exacerbated inequities when the costly teaching hospitals were integrated into 
regional authorities (Rivett 2015).  He is more accepting of its effectiveness, 
noting particularly its effect on London.  
 
Rudolf Klein treats the RAWP only briefly, though he himself was involved, 
initially as a researcher with the ear of David Owen, and later as a health policy 
expert. He depicts the RAWP as a creature of technocratic planning within broad 
political consensus, and thus emblematic of the era that Thatcherism later swept 
aside (Klein 2005). Its prevailing ideology of efficiency allowed ‘paternalist 
rationalisers’ to dominate the field, with the RAWP an exercise in ‘rationing’ (the 
pejorative term preferable to the euphemistic ‘resource allocation’).  Eschewing 
evaluation, Klein notes comparatively slow progress towards equalisation while 
acknowledging its work in addressing London’s over-provision.  
 
Turning to more specialist accounts, Walter Holland includes the RAWP, of 
which he was a member, in his history of health services research (HSR).  
Holland was the University of London’s first Professor of Social Medicine, based 
at St Thomas’s Hospital, and had come to HSR from epidemiology (Holland 
2013).  He explains RAWP as politically inspired by pressure from Northern MPs 
who observed that their constituencies were underserved by new medical 
facilities.  His own contribution figures prominently, highlighting the influential 
St Thomas’s research agenda on resource distribution and epidemiological 
modelling of needs.  Holland trenchantly defends the RAWP, arguing that it 
successfully reduced funding gaps, and functioned with simplicity and 
transparency, in contrast to later ‘fiddles’ (Holland 2013: 161-6).  
 
Nicholas Mays and Gwyn Bevan, who worked on the RAWP as researchers in 
Holland’s department in the 1980s, take a similar approach.  Their historical 
survey of earlier policy-makers’ attempts to address the issue highlights both the 
degree of continuity informing the initiative, and the flurry of literature in the 
early 1970s that triggered action (Mays and Bevan, 1987). Finally, John 
Welshman’s study of the RAWP from the perspective of the Sheffield region 
broadens the reading of the intellectual precursors.  Contra Mays and Bevan’s 
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case for intellectual continuity since the 1950s, he asserts a step change in 
thinking began in the late-1960s.  Welshman also flags the policy role of health 
economists as an issue which ‘deserves more study than it has received hitherto’ 
(Welshman 2006: 232). 
 
Sources, Methods and Concepts 
The argument here will carry this forward, asserting the role of ideas and actors 
as a critical variable.  It will show particularly that the intellectual impact of HSR 
and health economics mattered, and that their proponents’ influence from key 
positions in the policy-making architecture was instrumental, both to the genesis 
of the RAWP, to its recommendations and to the embedding of its findings.  It 
builds on recent work on disciplinary developments in postwar public health 
research which has deepened understanding of the research/policy relationship 
(Sheard 2013; Holland 2013; Shergold and Grant 2008). It also draws on the 
archival record of the RAWP period which is now mostly in the public domain 
(with the exception of material relating to the late-1980s RAWP Review, for 
which our freedom of information requests remain unsuccessful). It relies too on 
recent oral and written memoirs of participants and key civil servants, who, with 
the benefit of distance offer candid and illuminating reflections. 
 
In order to conceptualize these issues a theoretical resource from political 
science, the ‘advocacy coalition framework’ (ACF), is employed.  Associated 
principally with Paul Sabatier, this has gained traction as a useful heuristic for 
understanding policy processes in liberal democracies (Sabatier 1988).  It 
emerged to address inadequacies of existing models.  For example pluralist 
approaches that treated policy as balancing the demands of competing interest 
groups neglected the power of changing ideas to shape outcomes.  Similarly, 
institutional approaches that set out programmatic ‘stages’ – issue recognition, 
agenda setting, solution finding, political action – were too focused on temporal 
processes rather than causal mechanisms operating over a long run (Heintz and 
Jenkins- Smith 1988; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994).  
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The ACF instead depicts change as the outcome of struggle between groups 
within a given ‘sub-system’, or field, of policy.  An advocacy coalition includes all 
actors whose beliefs and ideas shape a shared goal: thus it can include 
bureaucrats, legislators and formal interest groups, but also academics, 
journalists and others.  The assumption is that research evidence matters 
because it furnishes resources to advocacy coalitions as they seek to influence 
‘policy brokers’ - ministers and senior civil servants.  However, such ‘policy-
oriented learning’ does not translate swiftly or rationally into action: politics is 
too determined by core beliefs about the world, anchored in emotion or instinct, 
for this to occur (Schlesinger 1968: 285; Sabatier 1988: 143-7). Indeed the ACF 
holds that all public policy change is essentially a ‘translation of belief’ into 
action (Weible, Sabatier, McQueen 2009: 122-3).  
 
Thus members of advocacy coalitions will themselves be motivated partly by 
their ‘deep core beliefs’ (for example about the desirability of an egalitarian or a 
libertarian approach to health systems), partly by ‘policy core beliefs’ (for 
example about equal access for equal health needs) and only partly by secondary 
‘narrower beliefs’ on technical aspects of policy, which are open to modification 
(Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994, 180-82). This does not mean, as some claim, 
that research only serves to legitimize decisions taken for other reasons (Klein 
1990: 503-6, 513; Schlesinger 1968: 283-4).   Instead it is assumed to exercise a 
longer-term ‘enlightenment’ function, reshaping debate more gradually, and 
strengthening cumulatively the advantage of one or other coalition (Weiss 
1977).  Hence a timeframe of at least a decade will be required to observe the 
effects of research on policy.   
 
While proponents of the thesis emphasize the play of ideas, they also explain 
policy change by reference to the parameters in which these are debated 
(Sabatier 1988: 134-9, 155-7; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1994: 183-4; Weible, 
Sabatier, McQueen 2009: 130-1).  Some of these can be relatively fixed.  For 
example, is the constitutional structure in which debates are held conducive or 
inimical to reaching solutions?  Is the nature of the problem essentially practical, 
or does it encompass value-laden and potentially divisive social factors? The ACF 
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hypothesizes that where debates are ‘technical and tractable’, then a non-
partisan ‘cross-coalition learning’ can occur.  Other factors are more short term, 
including changes of governing party or of the socioeconomic environment, 
which reframe the policy context and usher hitherto background issues to the 
fore.  A final factor of change can be the composition of the advocacy coalition 
itself, as new members and intellectual resources are incorporated.  
The argument advanced here is that an advocacy coalition around spatial 
redistribution of health resources formed in the early 1970s.  Drawing on the 
emergent disciplines of HSR and health economics, it crystallised concerns 
hitherto expressed by disparate voices, which had kept alive Bevan’s original 
ideal.  An oppositional coalition existed, favouring a market-driven alternative, 
but remained marginal despite some support from health economists.  Against 
both groupings was the tendency of the policy-brokers in the DHSS to maintain 
the status quo, with any redistribution incremental at best. However, once the 
RAWP was implemented a new coalition developed, uniting those who stood to 
lose. The next section therefore examines the first manifestations of this debate 
under the newly-established NHS.   
 
Proto-coalitions and tendencies 
 
The redistributors 
Although it is unrealistic to talk of a ‘redistribution coalition’ emerging in the 
1950s and 1960s, it is possible to distinguish early protagonists.  The first were 
located in the Department of Social Administration at the London School of 
Economics.  Brian Abel-Smith, a newly qualified Cambridge economist, was key, 
as initially was Richard Titmuss who led a group of social policy experts whose 
pronounced Fabian perspective made them favoured advisers to Labour 
politicians (Sheard 2013; Halsey2004). In 1953-6 they worked on the Guillebaud 
Report, an investigation into the cost of the NHS which demonstrated the good 
value it offered to tax-payers (Abel-Smith and Titmuss 1956). It also included 
discussion of  underinvestment in new hospitals since 1938, the lack of incentive 
for regions to use allocations efficiently, and variations in local authority health 
funding, with attendant impacts (Cmd. 9663 1956). Though not explicitly 
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challenging spatial inequities, the Report instead argued for better statistical 
data to support policy making (Cmd. 9663 1956: 250, 267).  
 
A second interested party was the UK Treasury, which expressed early concerns 
about the method of calculating regional allocations. Its Select Committee on 
Estimates found that these simply perpetuated existing expenditure patterns, 
with marginal adjustments for salary increases and inflation. Such an approach 
meant that ‘lack of proper economy can go unchecked and variations in cost 
between Region and Region may tend to become entrenched’ (Select Committee 
on Estimates 1956: para 19). 
 
The third early advocate was the Acton Society Trust, a non-partisan research 
charity. Between 1955 and 1959 it published six pamphlets on hospitals and the 
state, written by its director Teddy Chester, later Chair of Social Administration 
at the University of Manchester (Acton Society Trust 1958; Snow 2013).  Chester 
described the Ministry of Health’s ability to alter established patterns through 
bidding to the Treasury for extra discretionary funds for extensions or 
improvements (Acton Society Trust 1958: 28-9). Though noting some shifts in 
overall distributions away from the Metropolitan Regional Hospital Boards, 
Chester argued that better empirical evidence was vital if ‘dangerous’ allocative 
mistakes were to be avoided.  For individual hospitals this should set accurate 
costing against performance expectations based on national utilization 
indicators (Acton Society Trust 1959: 7-8). Chester’s call for the Ministry to 
accelerate its external research program (from which his own university 
department stood to benefit) was echoed by the Trust’s chair Sir George 
Schuster, also a RHB chairman (Acton Society Trust 1959: 49-55).    
 
The Marketeers 
Despite the political consensus and public approval that the NHS enjoyed, a 
strand of opinion existed favouring private medicine in its stead.  Narrowly 
based, principally among reactionary medics and academic economists, this 
‘marketeers coalition’ remained politically marginal (Seaton 2015).  However it 
articulated a vision of medicine in which resource allocation was best expressed 
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through demand in the marketplace.  In their efforts to demonstrate the failings 
of the NHS by the late-1960s, it was the ‘marketeers’ who brought forth 
compelling data showing the persistence of uneven distribution.   
 
A prominent early figure was the economist Dennis Lees who argued in 1961 
that health could reasonably be treated like any other good in the marketplace 
(Williams 1998). Lees had imbibed the ideas of Milton Friedman while studying 
in Chicago, and subsequently championed neoliberal policies (Anon 2008). His 
perspective aligned with that of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), a free-
market think-tank established in 1955 to promote Hayek’s thought (Stedman 
Jones 2012).  Not only did the IEA’s leading light, Arthur Seldon, write on health 
care, it also introduced American critiques, such as James Buchanan’s application 
of public choice theory to the NHS: unbounded desire to consume health services 
conflicted fatally with resistance to commensurate levels of taxation, so better to 
let markets adjudicate supply and demand (Jackson forthcoming). A celebrated 
joust between the IEA and Titmuss occurred over the latter’s study of the 
economics of blood donation, The Gift.  Titmuss used this case both to 
demonstrate market failure in health and to argue for the motivating force of 
altruism.  Various economists such as Tony Culyer held an opposing view and a 
vigorous dispute ensued (Fontaine 2002; Cooper and Culyer 1968).  
 
The misallocation of resources by state inaction was therefore already a theme of 
the marketeers’ coalition when it gained a foothold in the British Medical 
Association (BMA) in 1967.  Doctors were angry that their remuneration was 
lagging and wanted NHS funding to rise to address this.  A BMA faction led by 
Ivor Jones considered establishing a rival insurance system and flirted with 
economists critical of the service like Seldon (Mencher 1968). Their report 
Paying for Health Services contained a lengthy Appendix by two health 
economists, which suggested the ‘ideal of equality’ was a chimera (Cooper and 
Culyer 1967).  Detailing and correlating indicators of provision, costs, specialist 
care, and health outcomes, Cooper and Culyer argued that the NHS had failed to 
deliver ‘social justice’, that Northern ‘more working class areas’ were 
disadvantaged, and ‘that discrimination works ... in favour of the better-off 
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citizens’ (1967: 208-14).  They adopted the marketeers’ position, that the 
problem was a lack of managerial incentives to address demand, and floated 
three possible solutions: reversion to private medicine, better planning by the 
state (‘not really a sensible objective’), or a mixed system which injected demand 
through vouchers or (their preference) insurance (Cooper and Culyer 1967: 207, 
242-9). Thus the marketeers’ coalition had encouraged sophisticated analysis of 
spatial inequity, in which British health economists took a more libertarian 
stance.  
 
Incrementalist policy-brokers 
Throughout the pre-RAWP period then, the problem was identified, but 
remained peripheral in policy circles.  In ACF terms, the policy-brokers 
supported a status quo in which only very gradual change was countenanced.  
This followed the political upheavals of the service’s birth, after which a policy of 
continuity with prior patterns of funding was adopted.  As post-war austerity 
was gradually relinquished, real increases maintained this status quo. Ministry 
bureaucrats had some latitude to direct extra funds to poorer regions, though 
through ad hoc assessment rather than statistical principle.  This achieved some 
shifts between 1950/51 and 1958/59: for example the overall share of the 
distribution to England and Wales of the four Metropolitan RHBs had fallen from 
41.7% to 38.3%, while various regions had gained, such as Newcastle, whose 
share rose from 5.3% to 6% (Acton Society Trust 1959).  In the 1960s a new, 
potentially redistributive, approach emerged with the Hospital Plan, a building 
program aiming to create a network of district general hospitals. Planning was 
premised on ideas about optimal bed to patient ratios for the major categories of 
care, and regional estimates of new facilities required. Renewal of capital stock, 
and the consequent adjustments to current funding needs, would therefore bring 
in its train a more rational distribution.  Until then, incrementalism could 
continue. 
 
Discussions about replacing this with a formula approach finally began in the 
late 1960s.  It was becoming clear that the Hospital Plan would not be quickly 
fulfilled, due to lack of building capacity and a deteriorating national economy 
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(Crossman 1976). Instead policy under Labour’s Richard Crossman turned to 
reconfiguring the NHS’s tripartite administrative structure, which divided the 
RHBs from primary care and public health.  Crossman was particularly frustrated 
by ministerial impotence over the ‘self-perpetuating oligarchies’ that ran the 
RHBs, which he considered to be ’80 per cent non-Labour’ (Crossman 1976: 255-
6, 804). Their constitution had essentially preserved the pre-NHS status quo in 
which ex-voluntary hospital and consultant elites dominated, tending to 
privilege the interests of acute care over mental health and geriatrics.  It was 
reorientation towards these programs, rather than spatial readjustment per se, 
that Crossman sought, particularly after various scandals exposed the failings of 
‘chronic’ care (Crossman 1976: 419, 466).  However, a Ministry official, Dick 
Bourton, convinced him of the ‘great unfairness to Sheffield, Newcastle and 
Birmingham’ that current financing methods maintained. His 1970 Green Paper 
on NHS restructuring flagged their replacement by a needs-based population 
formula as the ‘long-run’ aim (Crossman 1976: 569).  This put in train the 
creation of the ‘Crossman formula’ by his adviser Brian Abel-Smith, which was 
actually implemented under Crossman’s Conservative successor, Sir Keith 
Joseph.  
 
In the event the new formula perpetuated incrementalism.  The RHBs 
collectively put up a ‘tremendous struggle to maintain the status quo’, although 
the main difficulty lay with the formula itself (Crossman 1976: 876).   This 
proposed that 50% of a region’s allocation should be determined by population 
size, 25% by its number of existing beds, and 25% by its utilisation levels.  As 
would soon become clear, provision and utilisation rates were faulty indicators 
of need, because hospital usage tended to follow supply.  Nor would population 
alone help, without some adjustment for anticipated morbidity (Holland 2013).  
A further complication was introduced by the Revenue Consequences of Capital 
Schemes (RCCS) portion of funding, which augmented regional allocations to 
take account of the presumed extra current spending which new building under 
the Hospital Plan would incur. This tended to favour the Southern regions where 
more new infrastructure development had occurred. In sum, despite awareness 
of maldistribution, substantive change was impeded by the policy-brokers’ 
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acceptance of the status quo maintained by regional NHS leaders, coupled with 
technical uncertainty about how to achieve readjustment. 
 
Consolidation of an Advocacy Coalition 
 
A redistribution coalition emerges 
In the years immediately preceding the establishment of the RAWP, it is possible 
to discern an advocacy coalition emerging to alter this.  There are three senses in 
which this happened.  Academic research promulgated the intellectual 
justification for spatial redistribution; health services researchers and health 
economists became accepted as technical experts who could offer policy-
relevant advice; and individuals conversant with these disciplines and 
sympathetic to core egalitarian values gained access to policy-brokers (Klein 
1976: 468-71). Thus by 1975 a loose advocacy coalition was in place, by no 
means focused on spatial redistribution as a single urgent issue, but with the 
belief and expertise to drive ‘policy-oriented learning’. 
 
The intensification of public discussion began with Julian Tudor Hart’s 1971 
Lancet paper proposing an ‘inverse care law’.  A socialist GP, epidemiologically 
trained and based in industrial South Wales, Tudor Hart argued that medical 
resources tended to be lowest where population needs were greatest (Tudor 
Hart 1971). Although his call to action lacked empirical justification this was 
soon to be supplied by others (WS 2014: 19). Key contributions were made by 
health economists from the University of York, Cooper and Culyer, then Alan 
Maynard (1971, 1972), and Peter West (1973), who demonstrated the failings of 
the Crossman formula.  John Rickard, originally with the Oxford Regional 
Hospital Board, produced a study of unevenness between its areas and later 
extended the analysis nationwide (WS 2014: 75; Rickard 1974).  Another 
affirmation of the inverse care law in the Lancet showed a negative correlation 
between financial allocations to community health services and the percentage 
of population in lower socioeconomic groups (Noyce, Snaith and Trickey 1974).   
In the year of the RAWP’s appointment, the BMJ carried papers by Gentle and 
Forsythe, and by Buxton and Klein (1975), the latter reporting regional 
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variations from national means of hospital services spending of +41% to -23%, 
with intra-regional differences even greater.  
 
This growing volume of technical analysis is best understood in the light of 
larger developments in academic public health.  The speciality of HSR had 
emerged in the 1960s initially because epidemiologists became interested in the 
relationship between service inputs and health outputs (Morris 1957: ch.3; 
Berkowitz 1998).  Medical sociologists and operational researchers providing 
academic training for NHS managers also contributed, and the sub-disciplinary 
trappings of a journal (Medical Care), and scholarly meetings soon arrived.  The 
availability of funding from the MRC and the Ministry of Health meant that in 
addition to Holland’s group, various other centres became prominent (Bierman 
et al., 1968). Much effort went into understanding utilization patterns, the better 
to plan service needs.  This included a major survey of Liverpool and Manchester 
by Robert Logan’s cluster at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, which included Rudolf Klein and John Ashley (both RAWP actors), and 
Holland’s studies of the St Thomas’s Hospital catchment in London (Logan et al., 
1972). These demonstrated that usage rates responded to existing provision 
rather than to underlying population factors, a finding already established by 
American investigators Milton Roemer and Kerr White (Shain and Roemer 1959; 
White, Greenberg and Williams 1961).   Another pivotal moment was the 
publication in 1972 of Effectiveness and Efficiency by the epidemiologist Archie 
Cochrane (best known today as progenitor of the Cochrane Collaboration centres 
for collating systematic reviews).  He urged that randomised controlled trials be 
applied to clinical therapies and procedures to ensure ‘effectiveness’ (they 
worked in a laboratory setting) and ‘efficiency’ (they were cost-effective in the 
real world), with the ethical imperative that all effective treatment should be free 
(Cochrane 1972; Berkowitz 1998).  
 
The consolidation of health economics came in the wake of these earlier trends.  
A social policy specialty within economics had a long lineage, concerned 
principally with explaining trends in public spending.  Jack Wiseman had made 
this a departmental focus at the University of York, and one of his protégés, Alan 
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Williams, had narrowed his interests to health and established a research 
cluster, in which Culyer and Maynard became major figures (Croxson 1998). An 
early symposium convened by Wiseman announced the specialty’s identity and 
preoccupations (including three papers on resource allocation), but it was the 
inaugural meeting of the Health Economists’ Study Group (HESG), again led by 
the York centre, which definitively signalled arrival (Williams 1998; Hauser ed. 
1972). The HESG went on to become a forum for engaging academics and policy-
makers, and Williams’ stewardship ensured British health economics adopted an 
advisory posture compatible with the NHS. Contra Dennis Lees, Williams had 
argued that the economics of the firm did not well suit analysis of health, a 
position also developed in the United States by Kenneth Arrow, who identified 
market failures of commoditised health care, arising from information 
assymetries between patient and doctor and consequent trust problems 
(Williams 1998). Later Williams declared himself supportive of Cochrane’s 
egalitarian philosophy, believing that economics brought to it the dispassionate 
tools of assessment (Williams 1997).  
 
Actors and relationships 
These disciplinary developments bore upon the redistributors’ coalition in a 
practical sense: people espousing new ideas now confronted the policy-brokers 
more closely.  In an early placement with the Treasury Williams riled health 
officials by criticising the lack of statistical indicators on which to base policy 
decisions (Williams 1997). Cochrane was amongst his audience, and liked what 
he heard, subsequently recruiting an economist, David Pole, to his department of 
epidemiology at the University of Cardiff (WS 2014: 79).  Pole was a Cambridge-
trained contemporary of Abel-Smith, and after Cardiff moved to join the 
Economic Adviser’s Office (EAO) at the DHSS; he was also a HESG member.  
York’s direct influence came not only from Culyer, Cooper and Maynard’s 
interventions, but from the careers it fostered.  Peter West was a PhD student of 
Culyer’s, who followed a parallel trajectory to Pole, as an economist joining 
Holland’s Community Medicine unit to work on resource allocation (WS 2014: 
21-2, 31). Terri Banks, a DHSS official who later played a major part in 
implementing RAWP, had learnt economics methods from Williams while he was 
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seconded to the Treasury (personal communication, October 7, 2015).  Jeremy 
Hurst and John Rickard were both early HESG members who worked with Pole 
at the EAO and were involved with RAWP (WS 2014: 79-80; Croxson 1998; Hurst 
1998).  
 
Finally, Brian Abel-Smith, with whom the concern for indicators of health 
resource allocation had begun in the 1950s, had achieved an influential position.  
Now an international leader in health systems statistics, he had acted as a special 
adviser to Crossman and understood the workings of the DHSS (Sheard 2013). 
With Labour’s victory in 1974 he returned to advise Castle and Owen, who 
valued his expertise and diplomatic skills.  They perceived him as ‘utterly 
Labour, to his core’, and as someone whose pragmatism counter-balanced 
idealism (WS 2014: 15).  He also remained significant in public policy research at 
the LSE, where his appointee Bleddyn Davies had analysed spatial inequities in 
local government, coining the phrase ‘territorial justice’ (Davies 1969).  He 
helped shape HSR too, chairing the advisory committee of Holland’s unit at St 
Thomas’s Hospital (on whose governing board he had sat).  
 
External factors of change 
Looking beyond individual agency,  what aspects of the external environment, in 
ACF terms, helped facilitate change?  First, it should be noted that the RAWP 
debate began under a broad consensus over the core values of the NHS.  It could 
be positioned as essentially a technical question of means, which assumed the 
ends of spatial equity were uncontested.  The Conservatives had accepted these 
in principle when they implemented the Crossman formula, so in parliamentary 
terms this was a neutral issue. A new GP contract had quelled the libertarian 
rebels in the BMA, removing momentum from the marketeers’ coalition.  A 
window opened in which resource allocation policy could be discussed without 
immediately provoking controversy.  
 
Various other factors made it politically attractive.  By 1975 the health care 
economy was entering a transition.  The fiscal crisis of European welfare states 
was just beginning, as OPEC-induced oil price shocks coincided with the end of 
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the trentes glorieuses (Lowe 2005: 315-27).  Although NHS spending remained 
relatively high under Castle in comparison to the tighter settlements demanded 
later, it was clear that the years of expansion were over (Appleby 1999). 
Ministers now accepted that the challenges of inequality would not be resolved 
by steadily rising NHS budgets.   
 
David Owen also favored an active policy towards the NHS.  Coming from a 
medical background, he saw it as embodying British values of altruism and 
citizenship rights, but felt strongly that the inequalities agenda had drifted 
(Owen 1976: 1, 3, 172).  Now that Keith Joseph’s1974 reform had resolved 
debates over the NHS’s administrative structure, it could be revived.  Moreover, 
with financial strictures looming, the case for adjustment could be made on 
grounds of allocative efficiency, thus spiking the guns of those set to lose from 
social redistribution (Owen 1976: 49-54). Finally, although the ACF approach 
minimizes individual actors, Owen’s intellectual capacity to master a complex 
brief, his willingness to confront vested interests, and his impatience with 
temporizing mandarins should be noted (Webster 1996: 747-9; WS 2014: 74-7).  
For all these reasons the redistributors’ coalition now had its opportunity. 
 
The Redistributors’ Coalition in Action 
 
Inception of the RAWP 
Two contradictory accounts of the RAWP’s establishment are provided by key 
actors.  Walter Holland recalls that Abel-Smith suggested his St Thomas’s unit 
should conduct research into resource allocation shortly after Labour’s return to 
office.  He devised a complex randomised trial of health authorities, selected to 
represent places with high or low cardiovascular, cancer and perinatal mortality.  
Some would receive earmarked financing to address these, while others would 
receive a general funding uplift, and the health outcomes would then be 
compared (Holland 2013: 161-2).  Owen promptly vetoed this proposal on the 
grounds that it was politically problematic to offer apparently beneficial 
interventions to one group alone (WS 2014: 25). Shortly after though, Holland 
was invited to join the RAWP, which Owen announced in May 1975, and he 
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believes his draft proposal, coupled with Abel-Smith’s urging, sparked Owen’s 
initiative.  By this stage Abel-Smith would have been well aware of research 
showing that the combined effect of the Crossman formula and the RCCS were 
worsening the problem. Moreover Castle trusted Abel-Smith and willingly 
delegated to Owen provided he was involved (WS 2014: 13-14).  
 
David Pole’s alternative account begins with a summons to advise Owen on 
principles of capital allocation. Owen had been asked to approve a new hospital 
in Conservative-supporting Lincolnshire, and was considering the justification, 
when other towns were equally deserving, such as in Labour Lancashire (WS 
2014: 74-6). Pole’s investigation began with the senior DHSS official responsible 
for capital schemes, who explained that the ‘imponderable elements’ were such 
‘as to make rational planning impossible’, before joking that ‘one found out 
where the local MP and the chairman of the hospital board lived, and took it from 
there’ (WS 2014: 74) Such was the confidence of incrementalist mandarins in 
their existing approach that they tried to dissuade Owen even from reading 
Pole’s subsequent report.  ‘Owen did, of course, read it’ and ‘immediately set up 
the ... RAWP’ (WS 2014: 75).  Pole also credits Abel-Smith’s intervention, 
believing that their personal Cambridge connection explains why the hitherto 
marginal EAO gained Owen’s attention (WS 2014: 78).  
 
Whatever the precise causal factors, the RAWP’s establishment placed key 
advocacy coalition figures in positions of influence.  The main committee 
included Holland, Forsythe and Pole, who also figured alongside others in the 
three sub-groups where the analytical work was done.  These were: RAWP(R), 
tackling the main revenue expenditure formula (Holland, Forsythe and Rickard); 
RAWP(C) addressing capital allocations (Forsythe and Rickard); and 
RAWP(T&R), responsible for assessing what teaching and research increment 
would be needed (Holland, Snaith and Hurst) (National Archives. 1975a).  
 
Problem parameters: technical issues or core values? ii) 
ACF theorists draw attention to the manner in which an advocacy coalition 
formulates and tackles a policy problem (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994: 191-
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3). Can it be framed as essentially a technical issue, where disagreements hang 
only on ‘secondary’ scientific criteria?  Or, as is often the case with matters of 
social policy, does it touch on core political values and thus court controversy in 
the public realm?  If the latter, then opponents may question a policy’s legitimacy 
rather than restricting debate to its detail, thus increasing the likelihood of 
failure.  Although the RAWP enjoyed cross-party consensus at its launch, this was 
by no means guaranteed to last.  London regions that stood to lose 
accommodated powerful interests in medicine and academia who potentially 
might mobilise dissent.  How then did the RAWP coalition succeed in coalescing 
support for core policy beliefs? 
 
One answer is that although its initial terms of reference were technocratic, the 
committee skilfully reworked these to consolidate non-partisan ethical 
credentials (WS 2014: 41).  Its brief from Owen had been to devise ‘a pattern of 
distribution responsive objectively, equitably, and efficiently to relative need’ 
(DHSS 1976: 5). The report however reinterpreted ‘the underlying objective’ as:  
‘to secure, through resource allocation, that there would eventually be 
equal opportunity of access to health care for people at equal risk’ (DHSS 
1976: 7). 
The power of this formulation lay in its simple affirmation of equal access for 
equal need. Further moral high ground was staked by the report’s title: Sharing 
Resources for Health in England.  This discursive positioning of centralised 
rationing as fairness and mutuality inhibited potential opposition, for who in the 
British polity could reasonably dispute these principles?   
 
Another key factor was the attention to consensus-building in the committee’s 
make-up and working.  It combined representation of DHSS and NHS staff, 
including authorities in both the South and the more deprived regions (Mays and 
Bevan 1987).  It also ensured a gradualist transition by issuing an interim report 
in August 1975, which set the next year’s formula pending final proposals. This 
signaled the direction of travel, though not the extent of what was planned. It 
combined in a ratio of 3:1 the first steps in the new population weighting 
calculation (Figure 1, Rows 1 & 2) with the Crossman formula’s inclusion of 
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existing utilization; it also maintained the RCCS portion, favoring the South, and 
applied a new increment to support teaching hospitals.  Finally it gave the DHSS 
latitude to avert objections by introducing the premise of a ‘floor’ and ‘ceiling’, so 
that no RHA’s allocation decreased or increased beyond +/-2.5% (National 
Archives 1975b: 7, 8, 12; DHSS 1976: 94).  Alongside its statement of key 
principles this signaled only a modest departure from incrementalism.   
 
Nonetheless the aftermath of the Interim Report was a dangerous juncture when 
the issue might have flared into controversy.  A BMJ editorial, ‘Painful 
Redistribution’, caught the attention of the tabloid press, which spun the story as 
‘Axe to fall on hospitals – Ministry’s secret plan’ (National Archives 1975c).   The 
capital’s Evening Standard similarly announced that ‘London bears brunt of new 
NHS cuts’.  Staff interest groups such as the National and Local Government 
Officers’ trade union, the Institute of Health Service Administrators and the 
Health Visitors’ Association were also exercised about threats to jobs and 
services (National Archives. 1975d).  
 
However, the policy core remained intact.  Of the regions, only the London 
authorities were actively opposed, with objections not leveled at principles, but 
at immediate budgetary implications (National Archives 1975e). For example it 
was argued that savings would necessitate service cuts, meaning the poorest 
districts within the over-funded regions would suffer too. In addition to 
Southern lobbying against too-rapid adjustment, several regions argued that the 
formula took insufficient account of social deprivation, and that the teaching 
allowance and London weighting proposals were as yet unconvincing (National 
Archives 1975f). In sum, the inflammatory aspect of the debate was articulated 
as a ‘cuts scare’, not as a controversy about promoting equity over localism.  
Castle was able to neutralize the former objections when, following annual 
departmental negotiations with the Treasury, she secured a budgetary 
settlement large enough to ensure a ‘floor’ that protected loser regions (National 
Archives 1976a). Remaining objections were not counter-proposals, but 
practical concerns about pace of implementation, and about making the formula 
more redistributive (National Archives 1976b).  
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The final element positioning the RAWP debate as a technical problem, bounded 
by agreement over core values, was the ‘buy-in’ of mid-level bureaucrats. ACF 
theory does not attend greatly to civil servants as members of an advocacy 
coalition, though it has noted for example, that they tend to be more moderate 
elements within the coalition, and may retain powers of clientelism (Weible, 
Sabatier and McQueen 2009: 129; Cairney 2012: 213-14).  The RAWP example 
affirms this, but reveals something more.  Owen had sought a formula that was 
‘readily available at all relevant levels of aggregation’, ‘would reliably predict … 
variation in health need between localities’, was ‘unambiguous’ and would 
‘reflect ‘need’ alone and not be influenced by supply’ (National Archives 1975i). 
Evidence suggests that as the process unfolded the DHSS members came to 
believe that this could be achieved, and that by its end they had a methodology 
that was transparent, workable and defensible.   
 
Crucial to garnering this internal support was the formula’s most innovative 
feature, the application of regional Standardized Mortality Ratios to adjust 
population allocations for ‘need’ (as proxies for morbidity) and ‘deprivation’ 
(because they correlated closely to poverty indicators).  Its adoption is 
illustrative of the advocacy coalition in action, although again there are 
conflicting accounts. Pole claims that it occurred to him while ‘(p)ondering the 
problem in the early hours’, while Holland attributes the idea to his St Thomas’s 
Unit and its comparative analysis of morbidity indicators (WS 2014: 25, 76; 
Holland 2013: 163). In any event, the documentary record of successive RAWP 
committee meetings points to joint endeavor between experts in HSR and health 
economics. (National Archives 1975g, 1975h, 1976c)  In January 1976 the 
strategy was approved and the RAWP(R) sub-committee tasked with finalizing 
the formula (National Archives 1976d).  Confidence grew following a modeling 
exercise, which showed that the over-bedded but comparatively deprived 
Mersey region would suffer less than the interim report had implied (National 
Archives 1976e).  By early 1976 the RAWP felt it had an accessible and 
acceptable formula with which to proceed. 
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Civil service buy-in to the ‘policy core beliefs’ was therefore explicable in terms 
of the science, but there was another individual factor which the ACF does not 
well capture: the role of John Smith, the RAWP’s chairman. Now a DHSS Under 
Secretary, Smith was an economist who had come to health administration from 
a background in social security when the two sides of the Department merged.  
He thus epitomised a changing departmental culture, as health policy opened up 
to ‘economists, the statisticians, the operational research people’ (WS 2014: 32, 
34).  Smith was also sufficiently senior to be unfazed at upsetting colleagues 
whom the RAWP disempowered (WS 2014: 79). Less tangibly, his style had the 
ability to inspire staff, and oral reminiscences of his leadership are fond and 
admiring.  Lis Woods, one of the RAWP secretariat recalls:   
 ‘… he was very clear that we must not aim for perfection; perfection was 
impossible. What we must and could aim for, and was possible, was less 
imperfection. I think that principle again helped us to do something 
practicable that worked and lasted’ (WS 2014: 35; National Archives 
1975b: 2)  
Thus as implementation neared, an esprit de corps was fostered in support of this 
‘least imperfect’ solution, within a broad consensus over equity goals. 
 
Implementation and the ‘Losers’ coalition, 1976-1989 
 
Counter-Coalitions and Changing Policy-Brokers 
Although it was launched in propitious circumstances with strong political 
backing, the RAWP’s embedding was far from certain.  A counter coalition 
emerged, which articulated stronger objections.  The outlook of the policy-
brokers altered too, particularly when Thatcherite conservatism challenged the 
ideological and partisan dynamics.  Internal review processes also presented 
opponents with opportunities.  Despite this, the advocacy coalition supporting 
the RAWP formula held firm, sustained by civil service support.  The problem 
parameters remained largely technical, and belief in the policy was sustained, 
even as challenges to the NHS’s core values emerged.  The result was that ‘cross-
coalition learning’ could take place, with consolidation and refinement of the 
formula.  This final section explains how. 
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An angry response of loser regions and hospitals followed the Report, but attacks 
on core principles quickly gave way to debate about the risks of rapid 
implementation.  Early critics included London consultants Sir Francis Avery-
Jones and, from a ‘marketeer’ position, Reginald Murley of the Fellowship for 
Freedom in Medicine.  They argued emotively that the RAWP formula neglected 
‘conurbation factors’ and social deprivation, which local clinicians could perceive 
better than ‘administrators’ (Avery Jones 1978; Murley 1976).  The Royal College 
of Surgeons, and also the editors of BMJ challenged the RAWP methodology in 
defence of the South-East, though this attack was short-lived (Anon 1976; Heslop 
1977).  Provincial BMA members were incensed at their national leadership 
lending support to ‘London’s howl of dismay’, which to under-resourced regions 
seemed like special pleading (Hole 1976; Lockley 1977).  However, more 
compelling arguments emerged from London’s primary and community care 
sectors, experiencing rising demand as hospital services contracted (Jarman 
1978). Brian Jarman, a GP and academic from St Mary’s Hospital, developed a 
new deprivation index to capture excess medical need attributable to poverty in 
inner-city practices, which implicitly challenged the RAWP formula (Jarman 
1983). Community Health Councils, the NHS’s newly created public 
representation bodies, also joined the fray in RAWP loser areas of the South (see 
Figure 2) painting adjustments as ‘cuts’ (Langton-Lockton 1978).  
 
Despite these budding objections, in the later 1970s the policy-brokers and the 
external environment remained favourable, even after the new Labour leader 
James Callaghan elevated Owen to Foreign Secretary and dismissed Castle.  Her 
successor David Ennals nonetheless maintained the inequalities agenda, 
including both the RAWP and Castle’s ‘programme budgeting’ initiative (Webster 
1996: 606-9). This was a related planning exercise that sought to redistribute 
resources across ‘client groups’, essentially to shift expenditure away from acute 
hospitals and towards older people, the physically impaired and psychiatric 
patients (DHSS 1976b).   Ennals also commissioned an enquiry chaired by Sir 
Douglas Black into the third dimension of inequality, the relationship between 
health outcomes and class, income and occupation (Webster 1996: 612-13).   
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Despite this continuity, Ennals’ tenure contained two flashpoints which might 
have presented an opportunity to the RAWP’s opponents. One was the Royal 
Commission on the NHS, into which the Wilson government had been bounced in 
1975 to assuage professional anger during a bitter dispute over private practice.  
In 1979 this produced the ‘first comprehensive, independent’ report on the NHS, 
including the RAWP (Webster 1996: 725).  Some of its evidence critiqued 
RAWP’s ‘centralising tendencies’ and crushing of local diversity (National 
Archives 1976-9).  However, it ultimately reaffirmed the policy’s core values.  Its 
review of the formula noted some of the underlying ‘heroic assumptions’ and 
stressed that perfect spatial equity was a chimera, but it accepted the ‘principle 
of equity’, and endorsed the mechanism as ‘rational and equitable’ (RCNHS 1978: 
3, 25, 27; RCNHS 1979: 344-5). Otherwise its concerns were methodological, for 
example over the proper adjustments to be made for teaching hospitals (RCNHS 
1979: 282, 345-6, 374).  
 
The other area of potentially flammable debate was internal.  Ennals had 
established a DHSS Advisory Group on Resource Allocation (AGRA) ‘to consider 
minor changes’ to the formula, relating to issues like patient flows, age/sex 
patterns of utilization and age-specific mortality weightings (National Archives 
1978e). The unspoken motive, however, was concern about RAWP’s impact on 
London. The capital’s areas and districts had begun developing different 
approaches to calculating sub-regional allocations, and AGRA was urged to 
intervene quickly, lest this become ‘extremely damaging’ (National Archives 
1978b).  Accentuating the difficulty was the work of the London Health Planning 
Consortium, whose remit was health services reconfiguration, and the Flowers 
Review of medical education in the capital.  These both were concerned about 
over-supply in the acute hospital sector, and seemed certain to exacerbate the 
RAWP squeeze when they eventually reported.   
 
Civil servants had therefore to tread a delicate line, preventing AGRA from 
becoming a platform for special pleading while also retaining enough latitude to 
manage the London situation.  John Smith managed this by keeping at arm’s 
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length the teaching hospital representatives or those with a ‘radical ... but 
dangerous voice’ (National Archives 1978a).  He also obtained an additional 
weighting for London, reflecting its supra-regional and specialty services, 
ignoring concerns that this was ‘protection for the status quo’ and a ‘backdoor 
method of funding the London teaching hospitals in the style to which they are 
accustomed’ (National Archives. 1978b 1978c, 1978d). This careful balancing act 
prevented AGRA becoming a forum for dispute, and its final report in early 1980 
endorsed the RAWP’s core principle of equal access for equal need, while urging 
ongoing research to allow fine tuning of the formula (DHSS 1980; WS 2014: 56-
7).  
 
Thatcherism and the resilience of ‘policy core’ beliefs 
The external context changed more emphatically after 1979, with the Thatcher 
government’s victory heralding new policy-brokers. There are several reasons 
why this threatened the RAWP process.  First, the Conservative government’s 
willingness to ‘think the unthinkable’ on welfare initially seemed likely to revive 
the marketeers’ coalition (Banks 2014). Free market think-tanks articulated neo-
liberal critiques of social policy, and the government’s Central Policy Review staff 
actively explored switching to an insurance based model of health service 
funding (Lowe 2006). Second, Thatcherite creed held that ‘inequality is not only 
just, it is necessary to freedom itself’, both as reflection of innate difference and 
as reward for wealth generation (Thatcher 1991).  The idea of directing public 
policy to ameliorating inequalities of health outcomes was incompatible with 
this worldview, as indicated by the rejection in 1980 of the Black Report by the 
new Secretary of State, Patrick Jenkin (Berridge and Blume eds. 2003). Equality 
of access might be vulnerable too.  Third, the party political calculus had shifted.  
Now it was representatives of the loser regions that wielded parliamentary 
power, for Tory strength was historically rooted in Southern England.  Finally, 
Jenkin’s early policy direction for the NHS emphasized a revival of localism as an 
antidote to the bureaucratized central state. 
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The durability of the RAWP therefore seemed far from assured as the 1980s 
advanced.  Sir Graham Hart, then a leading figure in the NHS Management Board 
and later Permanent Secretary at the DHSS, recalled:  
‘… voices were being heard from Number 10 and other political 
directions, quite insistently, through the mid-1980s … saying, ‘What is 
this, this instrument of torture, RAWP, which is inflicting pain on 
Conservative constituencies and giving money to Labour-voting 
constituencies in the north of England?’ It was not an obvious policy you 
could make stick and carry through with’ (WS 2014: 52-3).  
As before, the critical factors in explaining the RAWP’s durability are the 
continued framing of the issue as essentially technical, and the belief in the 
policy held by bureaucrats charged with its implementation.  
 
As the 1980s began then, work on improving the formula had stalled, and there 
were pressures bearing on the Thatcher government to row back from 
redistribution. Yet the policy core still held.  One reason was that macro-
economic policy dictated ongoing austerity for social programs, with real growth 
in NHS budgets now much reduced. In this context the RAWP remained 
attractive as a driver of allocative efficiency.  Jenkin’s successor Norman Fowler 
was also sensitive to equity issues, quickly scotching talk of a new funding model 
as politically unviable, a position eventually accepted by senior Conservatives.  
His argument was undergirded by a DHSS review setting out the problems and 
risks of insurance-based approaches, which, ironically, was prepared by Terri 
Banks, the civil servant later responsible, as Director of Health Authority 
Finance, for managing RAWP (Banks 2014).  Thus revival of the marketeers’ 
coalition was muted, its influence confined to promoting private medical 
insurance and the contracting of ancillary services.  It was also fortuitous that 
Fowler and his Minister of State Kenneth Clarke both held Midlands seats 
(Sutton Coldfield and Rushcliffe) so were not subject themselves to immediate 
constituency pressures from ‘losers’.   
 
By the mid-1980s another juncture was reached at which policy change might 
have occurred: the RAWP Review.  This arose from Fowler’s focus on enhancing 
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NHS productivity through stronger management and better performance 
indicators.  Following a report by a leading industrialist, Sir Roy Griffiths, he set 
up a new NHS Management Board, conceived on the model of corporate general 
management, nominally to take responsibility for planning, implementation and 
expenditure out of the political arena (Edwards & Fall 2005). In December 1985, 
shortly after its establishment, Fowler tasked the Board to recommend 
improvements to the RAWP formula in light of experience, new research and 
consultation.  Though instructed to prepare recommendations within a year, the 
Review team proceeded slowly, issuing an interim report in 1986 and requesting 
further time for research.  A final report appeared in 1988, recommending 
several changes to the formula. 
 
The RAWP Review illustrates again how those sympathetic to the policy core 
ensured that debate centered on means, not principles.  As with AGRA, members 
were appointed not for interest representation, but for technocratic ability, such 
as John Ashley, an epidemiologist specializing in morbidity measures (Ashley 
and McLachlan eds. 1985).  The Board also stated explicitly that the principle of 
equal access for equal need was ‘not in question’, (NHS Management Board 
1988). 
 
Even so, two issues threatened fundamental change. The first was the question of 
whether RAWP should be discontinued once it had removed historic inequities, 
which by now had been ‘substantially reduced’ (NHS Management Board 1988: 
para 1.2). This was firmly rejected: demographic change was ongoing so a 
national formula should be maintained (NHS Management Board 1986: 8).  The 
second issue was whether SMRs as an indicator of need should be abandoned, 
and now Jarman proposed an alternative formula that incorporated various 
social factors (such as measures of overcrowding and lone parenthood) 
alongside existing utilization (NHS Management Board 1986: 12-14, E5-6).   
Again this was rejected due to the problems of basing the formula on utilization 
and the risk of double-counting arising from the correlation between SMRs and 
deprivation indices.   
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Between the Interim and Final Reports debate hinged on specialized 
methodological matters. This was conducive to cross-coalition learning, but not a 
challenge to policy beliefs.  Jarman now argued for better sensitizing the SMR 
measure to social deprivation and the Review commissioned the accountants 
Coopers and Lybrand to lead a small area analysis of the problem.  It concluded 
that need for health services was determined by social factors above and beyond 
those captured by the SMR, and that Jarman’s ‘under-privileged area’ (UPA) 
index could model these.  The weighting of SMR to need ought therefore be 
reduced from 1:1 to 0.44, and the UPA index introduced to adjust for social 
influences (NHS Management Board 1988: paras 2.1-2.52). The ensuing debate 
was mostly arcane, centering on the conceptual entangling of utilization and 
need, and the appropriateness of Coopers and Lybrand’s regression analysis 
(Morgan, Mays and Holland 1987; Carr-Hill 1988; Mays 1989).  Occasionally 
rancorous ‘core belief‘ language crept into this technocratic arena.  One York 
health economist condemned the UPA measure as  ‘methodologically confused … 
out-of-date … and uninterpretable’, suspecting the whole endeavor was designed 
to favor London at the expense of areas in the North and North-West, which by 
the SMR rankings alone were worst off (Carr-Hill 1988: 10-11).  The St Thomas’s 
unit, where the SMR approach had originated, went further, identifying the UPA 
adjustment lobby as RAWP losers, purveying an ‘essentially political’ strategy 
driven by ‘powerful interest groups’ (Mays 1987: 46, 58).  Despite these 
critiques, the Review endorsed the changes, believing that in practice the effects 
would be ‘relatively small’ (NHS Management Board 1988: Table 1.1). Jarman’s 
concerns seemed sincerely driven by the pressures falling on London services, 
and civil servants shared this perception (Gorsky and Preston eds. 2013: 24-5, 
56-60; WS 2014 63). The debate had ultimately remained within existing 
parameters, and if the resulting compromise displeased some in the RAWP 
coalition, the intention at least was progressive redistribution to the poorest. 
 
Throughout the 1980s, the behaviour of those mid-level bureaucrats who had 
initially endorsed the RAWP remained crucial to its ongoing success.  Now in 
senior positions, civil servants such as Terri Banks, Michael Fairey (Director of 
Planning with the Management Board) and Jeremy Hurst (Senior Economic 
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Adviser, Economic Advisers Office) retained, in ACF terms, both core and 
secondary policy beliefs.  In contrast to the Black Report on health inequalities, 
whose costly agenda for change seemed hopelessly unrealistic to civil servants 
working under Thatcherite ministers, RAWP’s compound of equity and 
efficiency, its simplicity and transparency, and its underlying logic sustained 
internal support (Klein, 1990: 518-19).  When confronted with scepticism, civil 
servants felt able to defend the policy to Conservative ministers, whose fair 
dealing ultimately rewarded them (Banks 2014: 12-14).  
‘I was really surprised … and pleased, at the way in which officials and 
ministers – Norman Fowler and Ken Clarke – stuck to the policy, and they 
took a lot of stick for it… but I can honestly say that there was a real 
commitment. Terri is a very tough lady and she reminded them from 
time-to-time what we were supposed to be doing, and they did accept it in 
the end … you had to talk through it, but it went on. The redistribution 
went on’ (WS 2014: 52).  
In this sense then, the advocacy coalition that emerged in the early 1970s 
achieved its goal over the long term.  Though subject to later changes, such as an 
adjustment for social inequality introduced by the Blair government, and still at 
the heart of fierce debate, for example over the proper weight to be assigned to 
age as a need indicator, the RAWP approach successfully rode the waves of 
change to become established in English health policy. 
 
Conclusion 
In the taxonomy of comparative health systems it is customary to classify the 
post-war British NHS as the emblematic ‘Beveridge’ system, whose universalist 
aspirations were initially distinct from Bismarkian social insurance or more 
pluralist arrangements. Its history offers a case study of government and medical 
care in a tax-funded system, where the state is the main provider and health 
stewardship entwines with broader economic policy.  As welfare costs have 
grown government has increasingly sought to maximise efficiency and cost-
effectiveness while acknowledging the electorate’s visceral commitment to the 
NHS as a beacon of equity.  To achieve this it has pioneered several influential 
approaches, one of which was the RAWP, the subject of this essay.    
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To explain the inception and persistence of the RAWP formula, the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework approach was adopted.  This  is attractive because it offers 
an explanatory model that goes beyond the actions of political elites and 
narrowly conceived interest groups.  In the case of the RAWP, the model yielded 
helpful insights about the impact on policy of the slow diffusion of ideas, borne 
by academic experts and mid-level bureaucrats.  However, before recommending 
its utility as a generic approach to the history of health politics a few caveats 
should be entered.  First, European researchers have raised concerns that the 
ACF model is over-determined by the American political system, from which it 
was developed (Klein 1990; Cairney 2012).  There the division of powers and 
multiple veto points in the legislative process necessitate broad coalitions to 
sustain change.  By contrast the British polity, with its tendency towards single-
party majority government makes ministers less beholden to lobby politics. In 
this context, as the RAWP case suggests, advocacy coalitions imply a looser 
affiliation of actors with a level of shared belief and expertise.  Second, the 
emphasis placed by the ACF on the agency of these actors needs always to be 
balanced against the importance of structural economic forces within which they 
operate.  Here, the imperatives of furthering cost-effectiveness in the 1970s and 
preserving allocative efficiency in the 1980s provided the context in which the 
‘enlightenment function’ of research ideas could flourish.  Finally, while the ACF 
approach is helpful in reconciling conflicting evidence from personal testimony 
(as in the contradictory reminiscences of Walter Holland and David Pole), it 
underplays the importance of the individual and contingent.  The intellect and 
temperament of key figures like David Owen and John Smith, and the fact that 
Thatcherite health ministers represented RAWP-gaining areas, fall outside the 
ACF model, but matter to a convincing account. 
 
Nonetheless, the ACF approach proved illuminating, particularly in affirming 
Welshman’s speculations about the debut of health economics in policy circles.  
Indeed the HESG have themselves historicised the RAWP episode as the first real 
impact they made on government (Hurst 1998: S48, S51-2, S56-7). It also 
demonstrated how the ‘libertarian’ beginnings of UK health economics gave way, 
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if not to an egalitarian position, then at least to that of sympathiser (Williams 
1997: 118; 1998: S3-4). Thus in a 1981 essay the York triumvirate of Maynard, 
Culyer and Williams declared allegiance to the values underlying the NHS, which 
balanced freedom, social concern and equality.  The economists’ job was to help 
it ‘perform better according to its own lights’ – part neutral adviser, part 
advocate (Culyer, Maynard and Williams 1981: 339, 340). That said, the RAWP’s 
history also showed that this budding discipline did not automatically gain 
influence.  Instead it achieved access to power through the offices of others.  An 
earlier generation of expert advisers paved the way, exemplified by Brian Abel-
Smith, whose economics was grounded in social administration.  The growing 
interest of epidemiologists in the effectiveness and efficiency of health services 
also facilitated their arrival.  
 
Another central theme was the behaviour of civil servants as advocacy coalition 
actors.  This idea is not central to ACF theory as originally conceived, but was 
prominent here, in the importance of buy-in by mid-level bureaucrats who later 
became senior officials.  They represented a new cadre of administrators open to 
the management sciences of operational research, statistics and economics.  
Their support turned partly upon faith in the technical aspects of the formula, 
which despite its imperfections they found workable, transparent and 
intellectually coherent.  And, notwithstanding their retention of some clientilist 
powers to preserve stable service delivery in London, they also remained 
committed to the larger principle of equity of access, which extended beyond the 
transitory leadership of ministers.   
 
There are limits though to the assumptions we can make about the instantiation 
of core social democratic beliefs, notwithstanding the logic of the ACF approach.  
It is manifestly the case that since the mid-1970s the British political class, 
Conservative and Labour alike, has loosened its commitment to welfare (Castles 
1998). Comparison with other advanced industrial economies shows that across 
the spectrum of policy the state has retreated from universalism and social rights 
(Bambra 2006).  Even after the ‘New Labour’ era, inequalities of health outcome, 
as measured both by life expectation and by disability free life years have 
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manifested ‘no narrowing of the gap’ over time or space (Marmot Review 2010: 
48).  The coterminosity of this turn with the RAWP era lays bare some 
contradictions of the policy goal of equity.  Where fairness sits comfortably with 
allocative efficiency then it is more likely to proceed.  Where it does not, the 
appeal to social justice is harder to meet.   
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